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Abstract
Street demonstrations occur across the world. In Rio de Janeiro, June/July 2013,
they reach beyond one million people. A wrathful reader of O Globo, leading news-
paper in the same city, published a letter [1] where many social questions are stated
and answered Yes or No. These million people of street demonstrations share opinion
consensus about a similar set of social issues. But they did not reach this consen-
sus within such a huge numbered meetings. Earlier, they have met in diverse small
groups where some of them could be convinced to change mind by other few fel-
lows. Suddenly, a macroscopic consensus emerges. Many other big manifestations
are widespread all over the world in recent times, and are supposed to remain in the
future. The interesting questions are: 1) How a binary-option opinion distributed
among some population evolves in time, through local changes occurred within
small-group meetings? and 2) Is there some natural selection rule acting upon?
Here, we address these questions through an agent-based model.
Keywords: Opinion Dynamics, Collective Phenomenon, Agent-based model,
Computer Simulation
1 Introduction
Social dynamics have been studied through statistical physics techniques
in the last twenty years and are now part of the new branch of physics called
Sociophysics [2,3]. This recent research area uses tools and concepts of the
physics of disordered matter and more recently from the network science to
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describe some aspects of social and political behavior [4]. From the theoretical
point of view, opinion models are interesting to physicists because they present
correlations, order-disorder transitions, scaling and universality, among other
typical features of physical systems [4].
One of the most studied models of opinion formation is the majority-rule model
[5,6,7]. It considers a population of N agents, each carrying one of two possible
opinions A or B. A group of g agents (where g is an odd number) is picked at
random and all agents in the group adopt the state of the local majority. These
rules are repeated until the system reaches a final state of consensus, where all
agents are A- or B-supporters. In this work we introduce a mechanism in the
majority-rule model that limits the capacity of persuasion of the majorities,
and study the impact of this limitation on the opinion formation.
This work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model, define
its microscopic rules and discuss the numerical results. Our conclusions are
presented in Section 3.
2 Model and Results
We consider a population of N = nA + nB agents with opinions A or
B concerning a given subject. The initial fraction of A-supporters is D =
nA/N at t = 0. Each agent j has its own “convincing power” (CP), a real
number Pj initially sorted uniformly inside a given interval [−C,C]. A group
of g = 3 agents is randomly chosen 3 . If there is a majority of two, say i
and j, in favor of one opinion and the average convincing power P¯ = (Pi +
Pj)/2 of this pair is larger than that of the third agent, say k, this last flips
his opinion and the winning pair (i, j) increases its convincing powers, i.e.,
we update Pi → Pi + 1 and Pj → Pj + 1. Otherwise, nothing occurs. One
time step in the model consists of the application of those rules N times.
Notice from the microscopic rules that the agents’ capacities of persuasion are
limited, compared with the traditional pure majority-rule: only if P¯ > Pk the
majority succeeds in convincing the minority within the tossed g-group. In
addition, the updating of the CPs models the tendency for a given agent who
succeeds in persuading many others to increase his persuasion ability [8]. This
new ingredient introduces a historical long-term memory into the dynamical
evolution which turns it non-trivial, with its non-ergodicity exhibited since
beginning 4 . Thus, the inclusion of the above rules is a simple form to capture
3 In this sense, the model has no spatial structure, i.e., all agents have the same
probability to be chosen.
4 In spite the previous footnote, the model cannot be considered “mean-field-like”.
One cannot replace the tossed g agents by any kind of global average.
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this real-world characteristic.
Notice also that the distribution of CPs (uniform inside [−C,C] at beginning
or any other future form) can be freely translated by a constant displacement
(as a whole), and thus can include even negative numbers. This is due to the
fact that only the relative difference among the convincing powers (P¯ and Pk)
matters.
In this work we will present results for C = 5, but the behavior of the model
does not depend qualitatively on the value of C. One can start studying the
time evolution of one of the two fractions of opinions A or B, represented
by Ising variables s = +1 and s = −1, respectively. Since the system is
symmetric around D = 0.5, in Fig. 1 we exhibit the time evolution of the
fraction nA of A-opinions for typical values of D < 0.5 and population size
N = 105. In opposition to what occurs in the pure majority-rule model [5,6],
the initial minority can grow, eventually dominating all the population. For
the case D = 0.1, Fig. 1 (a), 90% of the population starts with opinion B
(s = −1). After few time steps the number of individuals with the minority
opinion A (s = +1) decreases, but the majority opinion B does not reach
100% of the population. In this case, the system remains in this state near
the consensus with nA = 0 (and nB = 1) for a long time, but after that the
number of individuals with s = +1 starts to increase and suddenly grows
until the consensus state with nA = 1. This behavior occurs for all simulated
samples (5 for the plot in Fig. 1, thousands in total). In the case D = 0.35, one
can see in Fig. 1 (b) that there is an oscillation with respect to the majority
opinion: initially the opinion A (s = +1) is the minority one, but after some
time steps a reversion occurs and the opinion B (s = −1) becomes the (second)
minority. In this case, the state s = −1 is shared by a very small fraction of the
population, less than the previous A-minority (near t = 10−20, see Fig. 1 (b)).
This new global B-minority opinion grows and dominates all the population
near t = 103−104. The first A-minority is not sufficiently small to win the final
consensus, in opposition to what occurs with the second, smaller B-minority.
This kind of oscillation and reversion of the majority opinion occurs three
times in the case D = 0.46, as exhibited in Fig. 1 (c).
The final victory of the (sufficiently small) minority is a consequence of the
limited persuasion considered in the majority-rule model, promoting selection
among the minority group but not among the majority, a Darwinian bottleneck
as explained below. Let’s take the case D = 0.1 for which we have verified that
the lower values of the fraction of A-opinions are close to nA = 0.02, i.e., ≈
98% of the population are favorable to opinion B (s = −1). However, as agents
forming the groups are randomly chosen, we have in this case many groups
of g = 3 individuals with s = −1, which does not change their convincing
powers. This fact explains why the system is kept for a long time in a quasi-
stationary state. During this period, individuals with minority opinion, when
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Fig. 1. (Color online) Time evolution of the fraction nA of A-opinions for population
size N = 105. Results are for different initial fractions of A-supporters, namely
D = 0.1 (a), D = 0.35 (b) and D = 0.46 (c). Arrows indicate which (A or B) final
consensus is reached. Each curve represents a single realization of the dynamics.
rarely chosen to form a majority in a g-group, can persuade individuals with
s = −1, upgrading their convincing powers. A tiny minority opinion (A, in
this case) group is nucleated with high convincing powers. They cannot be
persuaded to change to the majority opinion (B), and eventually dominate
the whole population.
One can better understand the behavior presented in Fig. 1 if we follow the
time evolution of the agents’ CPs A- and B-distributions. In Fig. 2 we exhibit
a typical realization for D = 0.1 and N = 105 agents, at certain time steps t.
The initial majority is favorable to opinion B (90,000 agents, see Fig. 2). At
t = 0 we have a uniform distribution of CPs with average 〈P 〉 = 0. After 1
time step one can see that the CP distribution for the current majority (B-
supporters) remains similar as at t = 0, no selection. But the CP distribution
for the current minority (A-supporters) changes: a selection towards high CP
is at work, the quoted Darwinian bottleneck. In evolutionary biology, popula-
tions suffering a drastic decrement in size tend to have a set of few individuals
with high reproductive activities. This leads to a corresponding decrement
in genetic diversity, the founder effect. Here, a small group of A-supporters
(a minority among the minority) consistently increase their convincing pow-
ers, surpassing that of all B-supporters. This small group can no longer be
persuaded, and keeps the minority alive. Finally, an inversion of the major-
ity opinion occurs between t = 210 and t = 220, until the consensus with
4
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Fig. 2. (Color online) Time evolution of A- and B- distributions of the convincing
powers for D = 0.1 and population size N = 105, for distinct time steps t. The
average value 〈P 〉 of the whole distribution is translated to the origin in all plots
(its original value is written). A- and B- averages are indicated by spikes. Observe,
already for t = 1, the sloped behavior of the lower distribution indicating the pres-
ence of a strong selection pressure among the minority, absent among the majority,
upper distribution. That is why opinion A eventually dominates the population, in
spite of being the initial minority.
A-opinion is reached.
In Fig. 3 we exhibit the time evolution of the CPs for D = 0.35. As in the
previous case, an initial minority supports A-opinion, but now it is not a
so small minority as for D = 0.1, Fig. 2. As time goes by, this minority
becomes majority and later minority again, eventually becoming extinct. For
D = 0.46 (not shown), the initial majority is slightly larger than the initial
minority. At beginning, the Darwinian selection bottleneck is weaker yet than
in both previous cases. The consequence is the occurrence of three majority
inversions. After the first inversion, the new minority becomes smaller than the
initial one, but not small enough. Only after the second inversion the minority
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Fig. 3. (Color online) Time evolution of A- andB- distributions of convincing powers
for D = 0.35 and population size N = 105. At beginning, the Darwinian bottleneck
selection among the A-minority is not so strong, as can be observed by comparing
the slope of the minority distribution at t = 1 with the previous figure. The stronger
the bottleneck (smaller minority), the stronger its selection pressure. Here, even
under a weaker selection than in Fig. 2, the minority also succeeds in becoming
majority between t = 10 and t = 20. But now the new B-minority is much smaller,
the Darwinian bottleneck selection is now strong enough to guarantee a further
majority inversion between t = 2500 and t = 2600. Eventually B-consensus is
settled.
becomes small enough to guarantee a further, definitive inversion. By gradually
increasing D towards 0.5, one can observe 4 inversions, then 5, 6, etc, forming
an infinite series. Similar behavior can be observed in biological models of
two-species competition, in which the species with smaller population size is,
under certain conditions, less susceptible to extinction than the more populous
species [9,10].
To summarize the results, we plot in Fig. 4 the final fraction f of simulations
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Fig. 4. (Color online) Final fraction of realizations (computer runs) which show ab-
sorbing states with A-consensus (m = +1) when the initial fraction of A-supporters
is varied, for some population sizes N . Notice the symmetry with respect to the
vertical and horizontal (black) lines.
which show absorbing states with A-consensus, when the initial fraction D of
A-supporters is varied, for some population sizes N . One can observe regions
(plateaus) were the probability of A-consensus is f = 1 and some others where
this probability is f = 0. Observe that these plateaus become ever more narrow
as the limiting case D = 0.5 is approached. Also, in the thermodynamic limit
(N →∞) the smooth curves that separate the plateaus will present a straight-
step, vertical behavior, i.e. the final absorbing state depends only on D, not on
the specific initial distribution of convincing powers. Furthermore, the above-
discussed majority oscillations occur more times as D approaches 0.5.
3 Final Remarks
To conclude, we considered a limited-persuasion mechanism in the majority-
rule model [5,6]. Thus, agents with a local majority opinion in a given group
can be persuasive only if their average capacity of persuasion is larger than the
minority’s conviction. This limitation provokes the appearance of a selection
rule acting in favor of the minority, a Darwinian bottleneck which opens the
possibility of the initially minority opinion dominating the population in the
long-time limit, provided it is sufficiently small. These findings suggest that
such behaviors, typically observed in problems with biological interest like
two-species competition ones [9,10], can occur also in sociological systems as
the human dynamics of opinion formation.
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